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community at large, is embodied in the statement by former Attorney
General Brownell that:
So long as there is to be a government of and by law, we hold
no doubt that the burden of prosecution is a community re-
sponsibility. . .. Equally, the burden of providing a fair trial
is upon the community. The right to representation is a con-
comitant of fair trial, and though it is personal to the defendant
and may vary with his choice and means, it cannot be permitted
to fail just because the accused is a poor person. At that point
the community must supply the deficiency.111
Betts v. Brady is interred, the way has been cleared, and a framework
provided-the community must now respond to the challenge to meet its
responsibilities.
IMPLIED AND EXPRESS WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
It has been noted that one-third of all sales litigation involves war-
ranty obligations in sales contracts.' It is expected, moreover, that the
warranty provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code and the changes
in existing warranty law which it effectuates will continue to provide a
major source of litigation. Even with the changes, simplifications and
clarifications which it has introduced into warranty law, the Code is in no
way a utopian problem-solving piece of legislation for the commercial
community. As evidenced by the extensive literature on the subject3
warranty law under the Uniform Commercial Code continues to be a
111. Representation of Indigent Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases (Hearing
Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repr., Feb. 17,
1954), p. 21.
1. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE),
36 (1955).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the citations are to the 1958 Official Draft which is
effective in Indiana on July 1, 1964.
3. See, e.g., 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 2-313 to -316 (1961);
Ezer, The Impact of Tle Uniform, Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales
Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 281 (1961); Mason, Article 2: Sales, 21 MONT. L. REV.
4 (1959) ; 49 Ky. L.J. 240 (1960) ; 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 331 (1954). The Uniform Com-
mercial Code has not met with universal approval. Compare Williston, The Law of
Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAIv. L. REv. 561 (1950) with
Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, Shoidd it be Enacted? 59 YALE L.J.
821 (1950). See also, Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779
(1953).
NOTES
major problem area. The following is an attempt to illuminate the key
warranty sections of the Code, to foresee some of the problems that may
arise in future litigation and to suggest possible solutions to these
problems.4
EXPRESS WARRANTIES: SECTION 2-313
Under section 2-313, the express warranty section of the Code, there
are three methods by which a seller may create an express warranty. The
first method is contained in section 2-313(1) (a) which provides that
"any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the af firma-
tion or promise."5  The most patent problem of section 2-313(1) (a)
appears to be that of language since the Code provides no definition of
the key terms affirmation of fact, promise and basis of thw bargain. More-
over, the use of the word or between affirmation of fact and promise in-
dicates there might be distinguishable methods of creating warranties
under this section.
Affirmation of Fact or Promise. The affirnmation of fact or promise
terminology was used in the Uniform Sales Act6 and, as in the Code, no
explanation was provided as to why the different terms were used or
needed. Some insight, however, is gained by an investigation of the
historical development of warranty law.
At common law, a mere affirmation of fact' was not treated as a
warranty' and some courts declared that an affirmation of fact was not
even evidence of a warranty.' To give rise to a warranty obligation, the
seller had to be explicit in his language by saying, "I warrant. . . .
The theory behind this common law distinction was that the warranty
4. At certain points, an investigation of existing law will be helpful in understand-
ing relevant sections of the Code, but this will not be the major method of presentation.
5. UNIFOnr COmmERcIAL CODE § 2-313(1) (a).
6. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-112 (Burns 1962).
7. Affirmation of fact is not easy to define in such a manner that it would apply
to all situations. It is probably best defined in terms of any positive statements or
representations as to an existing fact. See Stove v. McCarthy, 64 Cal. App. 158, 220
Pac. 690 (1923); Long v. Carpenter, 154 Neb. 862, 50 N.W.2d 67 (1951); Ralston
Purina Co. v. Iiams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943). In many instances an af-
firmation of fact would raise an implication of a promise.
S. See, e.g., Chandelor v. Lopus, 1 Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1625).
9. See, e.g., M'Farland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 60 (Pa. 1839) ; see generally 15
U. PITT. L. REv. 331, 334 (1954).
10. See HONNOLD, CASES ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING, 32 (2d ed.
1962). Williston suggested two reasons why an affirmation of fact would not create
an express warranty: (1) the substitution of assumpsit as a remedy for breach of war-
ranty and (2) the definition of warranty as an agreement in section 62 of the English
Sale of Goods Act. 1 WILLISTON, SALES, § 194 (rev. ed. 1948).
649
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obligation was contractual in nature and required the use of language
which evidenced an intent to warrant. A mere affirmation of fact, as
opposed to a promise, was not considered sufficient to satisfy this formal
requirement." This was a very restrictive view considering the situa-
tions where the seller's language was so ambiguous as to deny a clear
picture of his warranty obligations. Any practical or theoretical dis-
tinction between an affirmation of fact and a promise, however, was ren-
dered moot by the Sales Act which abolished the early common law dis-
tinction and accepted either an affirmation of fact or a promise as an ex-
press warranty. 2 The Code continues the Sales Act policy and, in effect,
any statement by the seller could be sufficient to create an express
warranty.
Basis of the Bargain. In section 2-313(1) (a) of the Code, a more
complex problem is presented by the use of the phrase basis of the bar-
gain,'8 which seems to set forth a different standard of express warranty
than the standard which appeared in the Sales Act. In the Sales Act any
affirmation of fact or promise which had a natural tendency to induce
the buyer to purchase and upon whichl he relied created an express war-
ranty.'4 Some authorities have thus concluded that basis of the bargain
imputes reliance by the buyer. 5
This conclusion, however, is fallacious in two respects. First, the
comments to section 2-313 specifically provide that "no particular re-
liance on [the seller's] statements need be shown in order to weave them
into the agreement."'" Secondly, if the drafters of the Code had wanted
to recodify the reliance standard of the Sales Act, they could have used
the Sales Act language to avoid the confusion. The fact that they did
not reiterate the specific language of the Sales Act supports the proposi-
tion that the Sales Act standard has been rejected, and reliance by the
buyer on the seller's affirmations of fact or promises need not be shown
to establish a warranty.'
11. See Heilbut v. Buckleton, [1913] A.C. 30. See generally Williston, Represcn-
tations and Warranty in Sales-Heilbut v. Buckleton, 27 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1913).
12. Teter v. Schultz, 110 Ind. App. 541, 39 N.E.2d 802 (1942). See generally 1
WLLISToN, op. cit. supra note 10, § 194.
13. This term is not defined in the Code.
14. IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-112 (Burns 1962). The language of the Sales Act cre-
ated an objective standard, ie., would a reasonable man have naturally tended to rely on
such statements by the seller.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. § 2-313, Pa. Bar Association Notes (1) (c) (Purdon
1954). See generally SMITH & RoBERsoN, BUSINESs LAW (UNIFORM COlMERCIAL CODE
EDITION), 417 (1962) ; 15 U. PiTr. L. REv. 331, 335 (1954).
16. UNIFORM CommERcIa L CODE § 2-313, comment 3.
17. See generally Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 617, 621 (1960) ; Ezer, supra note 3,
at 284-95; Mason, supra note 3, at 13; Winston, Article -- Sales, 22 TENN. L. REv. 785,
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Since the Code does not define basis of the bargain, some difficulty
is created in ascertaining the new standard of section 2-313(1) (a).
There is a strong implication in the comments to the section that basis
of the bargain is the agreement of the parties."8  The same implication is
reached from another avenue of Code interpretation by a general investi-
gation of the rights and remedies of a buyer when a seller has breached
an express warranty. 9  Under the Sales Act there was a specific provi-
sion for the buyer's rights and remedies when there was a breach of
warranty."0  There is no comparable provision in the Code. A buyer's
remedies for breach of warranty must, therefore, be found in section
2-711, the buyer's remedies section of the Code.2  A buyer can only in-
voke this section if he has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked ac-
ceptance, "- but a buyer can only reject the goods or revoke his acceptance
of the goods if the goods fail to conform to the contract.2" Therefore,
unless basis of the bargain means the same thing as contract, a buyer
could not reject or revoke his acceptance for a breach of warranty. Since
a remedy for a breach of warranty depends on a right of rejection or a
right of revocation, it must be concluded that basis of the bargain means
the contract of the parties24 as defined by the Code.25 Basis of the bar-
gain is, therefore, the legal obligation which results from the agreement
797 (1953). Although most authorities place much reliance on the comments, it should
be noted that usually the text of the Code is enacted by the legislature, while the com-
ments are not. For a succinct warning as to the use of the comments, see HONNOLD, op.
cit. supra note 10, 17-19.
18. "'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain ..
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 1. "In actual practice affirmations of fact
made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the descrip-
tion of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown to
weave them into the fabric of the agreement." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313,
comment 3. "In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty is
to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell . ." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-313, comment 4.
19. See generally Phalan, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales-Suimmary of Buyer's
Remedies, 16 U. P-rr. L. Rv. 209 (1955); 37 MARQ. L, REv. 171 (1953); 30 N.D.L.
REv. 223 (1954).
20. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-507 (Burns 1962).
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711.
22. See UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE § 2-711(1).
23. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-601, -608.
24. In various sections of Article 6 (Breach, Repudiation and Excuse) and Article
7 (Remedies) of the Code, the standard is in contractual terms. * See, e.g., § 2-607 which
deals with the effect of acceptance and speaks in terms of non-conformity to the con-
tract and breach; § 2-612, dealing with installment contracts, talks about non-conform-
ity; § 2-714 deals with the buyer's damages for breach in regard to accepted goods. All
these sections use contractual terms and basis of the bargain never appears, but all of
these sections deal with rights and remedies for breach of warranty.
25. Section 1-201(11) of the Code defines contract as "the total legal obligation
which results from the parties' agreement...." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-
201(11).
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of the parties, and an express warranty is any statement by the seller
which becomes part of the legal obligation of the parties.
Sale by Description or Sample. There are two other methods of cre-
ating an express warranty under the Code. Section 2-313(1) (b) pro-
vides that "any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description,"2 6 and section 2-313 (1) (c) provides that "any sample
or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model."27 Under the Sales Act a sale by description or sample created an
implied warranty that the goods must conform to the description or sam-
ple.2" The change in the Code seems analytically sound" in that it is not
necessary to imply a warranty since a description is clearly an affirm nation
of fact or promise, and in a sale by sample a seller is telling the buyer that
a particular unit is average.
Express Warranties: Conclusion. To understand, in a factual con-
text, how an express warranty is created it should be noted that there are
various levels of potential warranty-creating seller activity. If a seller
does or says nothing, no express warranty is created. For example, a
seller makes no express warranty when a buyer purchases a head of let-
tuce in a self-service store. The theory behind express warranties re-
quires that a seller do something before a warranty arises.
The next level of seller activity is where a seller says or does a mini-
mum, manifesting the name of the product. For example, seller offers
to sell buyer a car and buyer accepts. Here an express warranty has
been created that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or descrip-
tion of a car since the name of the product is either an affirmation of
fact or a description of the article. The delivery of a boat would be a
breach of the express warranty because the proposition that a car is not a
boat is fundamental and poses no problem. On the other hand, suppose
the seller delivers a car without a windshield or a car with one sparkplug
missing, with eight sparkplugs missing, with the motor missing. All of
these situations raise the question of whether the seller has breached the
express warranty that what he is selling conforms to the affirmation or
description of a car.
26. UNIFORM COIMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(1) (b).
27. UNIFORM COMMERCIA. CODE § 2-313(1) (c).
28. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-114, -116 (Burns 1962) ; Rinelli v. Rubino, 68 Ind.
App. 314, 120 N.E. 388 (1918).
29. Williston foresaw this change, see 1 'WILLISTON, op. Cit. supra note 10, § 223;
as did a federal court, see Universal Major Elec. Appliances, Inc. v. Glenwood Range
Co., 223 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1955).
NOTES
The question is more than academic in a situation where the total
obligation of the seller is what the name of the product creates. Assume
a seller sells a buyer a car with an appropriate disclaimer of all express
and implied warranties in the written agreement. Assume further that
the car at the time of the sale has defective brakes; and that buyer is in-
jured because of the defective brakes. He brings an action, not for
breach of any implied warranty (because of the disclaimer) or for
breach of an express warranty (because no warranty was made concern-
ing the brakes), but for the breach of the express warranty created by
the name of the product, i.e., a car with defective brakes does not conform
to the affirmation or promise of a car. It is no answer to say that this
is a jury question, because the point is whether or not the name of the
product is enough seller-talk to permit the buyer to get to the jury when
this theory is the only possible avenue of recovery for him.
In most situations, however, a seller does more than name the
product. In the typical sales transaction, there are many statements by
a seller which can be construed as either an affirmation of fact or as a
promise. Whether the statements are to be called a collective group of
affirmations of fact or promises, or whether the term description is ap-
plied to a seller's statements, it is not difficult to say that a seller should
be bound by the express warranties he makes.
It can be seen from the above analysis that the more a seller talks or
writes, the greater an obligation he is creating to deliver a product that
conforms to his statements. In some situations, however, sellers have
been able to persuade the triers of fact that no express warranties have
been created because the seller was only giving the buyer his opinion,
puffing or using dealer's talk. The drafters of the Code conceded that
"some statements or predictions cannot fairly be viewed as entering into
the bargain,"30 but they have provided no assistance in determining where
the line is going to be drawn between warranty and opinion.3' It is sug-
gested that unless some standard is created, the courts and juries will
look to the justifiable reliance of the buyer on the statements of the seller
to determine whether such statements contained a warranty or were only
an expression of opinion. The use of this standard will destroy for all
purposes the attempt of the drafters to eliminate the reliance requirement
of the Sales Act as a test for an express warranty.
30. UNIFORMI COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 8.
31. It seems that in this area one of the most litigated questions concerns whether
a statement by a seller that an animal is sound is a warranty or an opinion. The courts
have not reached consistent results. See generally 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 10,
§ 203.
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IMPLIED 'WARRANTIES: SECTIONS 2-314 AND 2-315
A. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY: SECTION 2-314
Historically 2 the seller's obligation as to quality has been developed
in the area of implied warranties. It has long been recognized that if a
man sells something, he promises that it is fit for some purpose." This
promise, condition or warranty, as it has come to be known, arises not
because of the seller's express manifestations, but by operation of law as
a result of the sales transaction.
The difficulty with this approach lay not in the creation of a quality
obligation, but rather in the determination of how much of a quality
obligation a seller created by entering into a sales transaction. Early
courts and statutes developed the theory that in a sale a seller must de-
liver goods that are merchantable. 4 What merchantable meant, how-
ever, was never uniformly decided, 5 and the courts developed many di-
verse standards for merchantability.
The Sales Act continued the implied warranty of merchantability,
but limited it to sales by description.36 The Code continues the implied
warranty of merchantable quality in section 2-3l14 but changes the prior
32. See generally HONNOLD, op. cit. supra note 10, at 55-69.
33. See Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (Ex. 1829).
34. See Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868) ; BRITISH SALES OF GOODS ACT § 14
(1893).
35. After a review of several hundred cases, Prosser felt that when a seller under-
took to deliver merchantable goods the extent of his obligation was at least that the
goods were: (1) genuine according to the name and description, (2) saleable in the
market under the designation, (3) fit for the ordinary uses and purposes of such goods
and (4) free from defects interfering with the sale or ordinary use. There was also
some type of quality guarantee, but the price a buyer paid had little consideration in the
cases. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117,
125-39 (1943) ; see generally Annot., 21 A.L.R. 367 (1922).
36. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-115(2) (Burns 1962); Rinelli v. Rubino, 68 Ind.
App. 314, 120 N.E. 388 (1918) ; contra, Bulldog Concrete Forms Sales Corp. v. Taylor,
195 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1952) (sale not by description). See also Torpey v. Red Owl
Stores, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (because the buyer selected the goods in a self-
service store, there was no sale by description).
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 states that:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to 'be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
NOTES
law in three ways: (1) the implied warranty of merchantability is not
limited to sales by description;" (2) the warranty extends to sales of
food or drink;"' and (3) for the first time in statutory form, the mini-
mal requirements of merchantability are stated. 0
The Meaning of Merchantability. In defining certain minimal re-
quirements of merchantability, some interpretation problems are pre-
sented by section 2-314(2) of the Code. Sections 2-314(2) (a) and (b)
provide that "Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as . .
pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
. . . in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description . . "."41 Some confusion is created by subsections (a) and
(b) because of the implications of "contract description" and "descrip-
tion." ,4 2  It would seem that the express warranty section of the Code
creates a warranty obligation if there is a description in the contract and
will create a conflict when the seller attempts to disclaim his implied war-
ranties, i.e., if the implied warranty is disclaimed, is the same obligation
enforced because of the express warranty created by the description ?
Further problems arise with subsections (a) and (b) because the
comments to section 2-314 state that these subsections must be read to-
gether." Considering them together it appears that non-f ungible goods
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the con-
tainer or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
38. See generally 1 ANDERSON, op. cit. sitpra note 3, § 2-314:3 (1961) ; HAWKLAND,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 43 (1955) ; Cosway, supra note 17, at 625; Winston, supra note
17, at 798; 15 U. PiT ".L. REv. 331, 335 (1954).
39. See UNIFoRM COMAERcIAL CODE § 2-314(1).
40. See UNIFORM COMMER IAL CODE § 2-314; see generally 1 ANDERSON, op. Cit.
supra note 3, § 2-314; Jaeger, Warranties of Merclantability and Fitness for Use; Re-
cent Dcvelopnnents, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 493 (1962) ; 15 U. PiTT. L. REv. 331 (1954). In
order for the implied warranty of merchantability to arise, the seller must be a mer-
chant with respect to the goods of the kind being sold. UNIFORM Colimcitr. CODE §
2-314(1). Under the Sales Act, the implied warranty arose whether the seller was the
grower or manufacturer or not. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-115 (2) (Burns 1962). The
absence of these words in the Code does not restrict this section. See UNIFORM Com-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 2.
41. UNIFORM CommFRclAL CODE § 2-314(2) (a), (b). The drafters in these sub-
sections were loose with their language, raising the implication that there had to be a
sale by description. But this has been negatived by subsequent interpretations. See note
36 supra. A problem with hidden defects is raised by § 2-314(2) (a), i.e., goods with a
hidden defect could pass without objection in the trade. This situation would be covered
by § 2-314(2) (c) and the goods would not be merchantable, because they would be un-
fit for ordinary uses.
42. The problem is also presented by the § 2-314(2) (d) language "within the vari-
ations permitted by the agreenient."
43. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 7.
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must at least pass without objection, but fungible goods must be of fair
average quality and pass without objection--the inference being that the
standard of fair average quality does not apply to non-fungible goods.
This inference poses no problem, but problems are raised by the Code
definition of fungible, which states that fungible:
[M]eans goods . . . of which any unit is, by nature or usage
of trade, the equivalent of any other like unit. Goods which are
not fungible shall be deemed fungible for the purposes of this
Act to the extent that under a particular agreement or docu-
ment unlike units are treated as equivalents.45
By this definition any time a sales transaction includes more than one
equivalent unit it is a sale of fungible goods. The drafters state in the
comments that fungible goods is a term appropriate to agricultural bulk
products.4" This creates a significant ambiguity since only by negative
implication is there an indication that manufactured products were not
intended to be considered fungible and are not subject to the standard of
fair average quality. Yet any multi-unit sale of manufactured goods
would seem to fit the definition of fungible goods.4
Another problem in subsections (a) and (b) of section 2-314(2) of
the Code is the determination of what is fair average quality for purposes
of a warranty of merchantability on fungible goods. As defined in the
comments, fair average quality means good centering around the middle
belt of quality, not the least, nor the worst, but such as pass without ob-
jection.4" It would seem, therefore, that irrespective of any fungible-
non-f ungible definitional problems, both types of goods are to be tested
by the same standard. Section 2-314(2) (a) provides that non-fungible
goods must pass without objection and the comments indicate that the
standard of fair average quality for fungible goods means those goods
which will likewise pass without objection.49
Subsections (e) and (f) of section 2-314(2), in setting standards
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: § 1-201(17).
46. See UNIFOm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 7.
47. Inasmuch as the definitional section is a part of the Code proper and hence
enacted by the legislature while the comments are not enacted, it would seem that the
stronger argument is that fungible goods include manufactured goods and agricultural
goods. One authority believes that the reason for the apparent conflict is a reaction to
the hostility to an earlier draft of the Code which applied the fair average standard to
all goods. Mercantile interests attack this and one authority states that the drafters of
the Code were ambiguous in the present draft, hoping to raise the standard of non-
fungible goods to that of fungible goods, i.e., fair average quality. See Ezer, supra, note
3, at 293-94.
48. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 7.
49. See HONNOLD, op. cit. supra note 10, at 75.
NOTES
of merchantability of the Code, present a possible conflict with section
2-313, the express warranty section of the Code."0 In subsections (e)
and (f), goods to be merchantable must also be "adequately contained,
packaged and labeled as the agreement may require."'" In addition, they
must "conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the con-
tainer or label if any ... . "2 It would seem that the express warranty
provision of the Code would create a warranty obligation in the situa-
tions mentioned in these subsections. If an express warranty can be de-
termined by looking at the agreement of the parties, 8 it would not be
difficult to fit an affirmation on the label into the agreement. Moreover
if the agreement itself requires packaging, then clearly this would be an
express warranty. It would be no defense by a seller that the label war-
ranties arose subsequent to the contract and, hence, were invalid in the
absence of new consideration, as was the rule under the Sales Act. 4 The
drafters of the Code declared explicitly that the time of the making of
the express warranty was immaterial if part of the original agreement.' 5
If the warranty is made after the agreement, the warranty becomes a
modification and, if reasonable and in order, it needs no new considera-
tion."
Assume that a seller agrees to sell a buyer 5,000 units and the agree-
ment requires that each unit be wrapped in a certain manner. Seller dis-
claims the implied warranty of merchantability. When the units are
delivered to the buyer, 1,000 units are defective in wrapping. To the
seller's defense that he disclaimed the implied warranty of merchant-
ability which required that the goods be adequately packaged as the
agreement may require, the buyer should be able to argue that although
the implied warranty had been diclaimed, the express warranty in the
agreement has not been disclaimed and recovery should be allowed for
the defective packaging because of the breach of an express warranty."
Section 2-314 and the Ultimate Consumer and Commercial Buyer.
The adaptability of section 2-314 of the Code as a means of creating
50. UNIFORM CoIMCIAL CODE § 2-313.
51. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (e).
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (f).
53. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
54. See, e.g., Olney Seed Co. v. Johnson Farm Equip. Co., 342 Ill. App. 549, 97
N.E.2d 480 (1951) ; Keenan v. Cherry, 47 R.I. 125, 131 Atl. 309 (1925).
55. See UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 7.
56. See UNIFORM COMMERClAL CODE § 2-313, comment 7; see also § 2-209 which
provides the requirements for modification.
57. There would be no problem in this situation if the seller disclaimed both im-
plied and express warranties. As will be developed later, however, it will be seen that
a disclaimer of an express warranty is almost impossible, while the disclaimer of the
implied warranty of merchantability is relatively easy.
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quality obligations on sellers can only be determined in the light of a
distinction which is overlooked by some writers. This distinction cort-
cerns the types of parties that are involved in sales transactions and the
distinction creates different problems in analyzing the Code standard of
merchantability.
Section 2-314 seems to envisage a sales transaction in which there
is an agreement and some type of negotiation, but in the sale to an ulti-
mate consumer there usually is no agreement or negotiation. For ex-
ample, a buyer walks into a seller's store, picks certain items from the
shelves, goes through the check-out aisle, pays for the goods and walks
out of the store. In these situations the only possible requirement that
the seller must fulfill is that the goods are fit for the ordinary purposes"8
and conform to any promises or affirmations of fact on the label." In
the majority of situations these requirements are sufficient buyer protec-
tion, but there are some frontier problems in consumer purchasing to
which the Code offers no solution.
The leading example is, of course, the allergy cases6" which represent
about twenty per cent of all products liability cases." Under the Sales
Act there had been a split of authority in allowing recovery for plain-
tiffs.62 The minority rule allows recovery if the allergic plaintiff can
prove (1) that the product caused the injury and (2) that the product
would cause injury to an appreciable class of persons.6" The majority
rule, while also requiring casual proof, denies recovery if the plaintiff is
not a nornal person.6" It does not appear that the standards in section
2-314 are going to resolve this conflict of authority. Assume a buyer
comes into a seller's store, purchases a jar of nationally known de-
58. See UNIFOaM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (c).
59. See UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (f).
60. The allergy cases are sufficient for present purposes to discuss the problems of
merchantability under the Code. Another frontier area which has caused a split in the
courts concerns the purchase of a food product with matter in it which cannot tech-
nically be call d foreign. See, e.g., Adams v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565,
112 S.E.2d 92 (1960) (crystalized grain of corn in a box of corn flakes) ; Betchia v.
Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (chicken bone in chicken sand-
wich) ; see generally Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and
Warranties, 4 BOSTON COL. IND. & Com. L. REv. 285 (1963); Annot. 143 A.L.R. 1421
(1943).
61. See HONNOLD, CASES ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING, 61 (2d ed.
1962).
62. See generally 46 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1960) which contains a synthesis of the
case law on allergies. Under prior law, the author of this article felt that the type of
warranty (implied warranty of merchantability, as opposed to the implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose) should not affect any decisions.
63. Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960);
commented on in 46 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1961).
64. See, e.g., Casagrande v. F.W. Woolworth Co., Inc., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d
109 (1960) (implied warranty of merchantable quality).
odorant and, subsequently, develops an allergy. Assuming no express
warranties, recovery must be based on an implied warranty of merchant-
ability which under the Code requires proof that the deodorant was not
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. 5
A court which has followed the majority rule in the allergy cases
under prior law could rationalize that the implied warranty of merchant-
ability does not protect a non-normal user. A minority court could re-
fuse recovery on the ground that because the product does not cause in-
jury to an appreciable class of persons, the product is fit for ordinary
use. Obviously such courts would be acting under the influence of local
policy which is possible under the broad merchantability concept of the
Code. The Code, however, does not restrict the courts to a following of
earlier precedents. It is quite possible for courts to espouse a broad
standard of buyer protection and hold that an injury to one person makes
the product unfit for ordinary purposes. The drafters of the Code fore-
saw that the standards of merchantability might require changes to adapt
to new factual situations and policy considerations. The language cate-
gorically informs lawyers and courts that if, in any given situation, it is
felt that a buyer should be allowed to recover, the courts may impose a
new quality obligation on a seller. The drafters specifically expressed
an intention to leave open other attributes of merchantability thereby al-
lowing courts to establish new standards if none have been defined, and
reject old ones when necessary.6
In the commercial buyer and seller situation, the problems of quality
obligations revolve around the relative bargaining strength of the parties.
If the buyer is in the stronger bargaining position, no problem is raised
because he can exact adequate warranty protection from the seller. If
the seller is in the stronger bargaining position, however, an analysis
must be made of the consequences of a sales transaction under the Code.
Typically, after the negotiations are ended, the seller will have dis-
claimed all of his implied warranties. Recent developments in the courts,
however, indicate that these disclaimers are not well received. Here the
factual problem is different than in the consumer market and the Code
has declared a policy of giving the commercial buyer some, but not com-
plete, quality protection. Generally the courts will hold the sellers liable
on their implied warranties, but the Code specifically provides that a
contractual limitation of consequential damages, where the loss is com-
,nercial, is not unconscionable and, hence, enforceable." This seems to be
65. See UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (c).
66. UNIFORM COm ERclAL CODE § 2-314, comment 6.
67. See UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE § 2-719(3).
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a more rational shifting of the burden of the risks in a sales transaction
between a commercial seller and buyer, and it would seem to invite com-
mercial sellers to avoid using the disclaimer of implied warranties. It
provides a buyer with some amount of protection, but at the same time,
allows a seller to limit his liability for consequential damages.
B. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE:
SECTION 2-315
The Code continues the Sales Act implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose,6" although modifying some of the standards of the
warranty.69 Under the Sales Act, before the implied warranty for par-
ticular purpose was imposed on the seller, the buyer had to make known
to the seller the particular purpose.7" Under section 2-315 of the Code,
on the other hand, the implied warranty arises if the seller has reason to
know the purpose intended and that the buyer is relying."' In other words,
there no longer is a duty on the buyer to inform the seller of his particular
purpose. Even though the seller does not actually know of the particular
purpose, if he has reason to know of the particular purpose, then he is sub-
ject to liability for breach of an implied warranty.72" '
For example, assume a buyer comes into a seller's camera shop and
asks for a roll of camera films. Three possible situations could arise:
(1) the seller could sell buyer a roll of camera film used by amateur
photographers and no implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose
68. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-115(1) (Burns 1962) ; see generally 1 WILLISTON,
SALES, § 235 (rev. ed. 1948).
69. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315; see generally 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 (1961) ; Collins, Warranties of Sale Under the Uniform Com-
inercial Code, 42 IowA L. REv. 63 (1956) ; Corman, Implied Sales Warranty of Fitness
for Particudar Purpose, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 219 (1958) ; Jaeger, supra note 40, at 506.
Both a warranty of merchantability and a warranty of fitness for particular purpose
may co-exist and recovery may be based on either one. Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New
Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960).
70. See, e.g., Rayl v. General Motors, 121 Ind. App. 608, 101 N.E.2d 433 (1951);
Toledo Plate & Window Glass Co. v. Smoger Lumber Co., 100 Ind. App. 620, 195 N.E.
577 (1935).
71. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. There is a conflict between the language
of the Code proper and the commentary, i.e., § 2-315 requires that the seller have reason
to know the purpose intended and that the buyer is relying. Comment 1 requires that the
seller has reason to realize the purpose intended or that the reliance exists. Despite the
apparent change of the statute, in the comments, both statutory requirements must be
met. See Loomis Bros. Corp. v. Queen, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 482, 46 Del. Co. 79 (1958);
see generally Collins, supra note 69, at 69; 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 331, 342 (1954).
72. It has been suggested that the reason to kiww standard imposes a duty on the
seller to investigate information which would reasonably lead him to believe that the
buyer may be purchasing the goods for a particular purpose and is relying on the seller.
See Collins, supra note 69, at 69-70. This suggestion is not supported by statutory or
commentary language and would result in unrealistic hardship upon the seller. See
Corman, supra, note 69, at 242-43.
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would arise under the Sales Act or the Code; (2) if the buyer would tell
the seller that he needs a special film to be used in photographing wild
life, an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose would arise un-
der both the Sales Act and the Code; (3) if the buyer tells the seller
nothing, but the seller has reason to know that the buyer intends to
photograph wild life (e.g., because the buyer belongs to a wild life organi-
zation which is presently engaged in photographing wild life), then under
the Sales Act, no implied warranty of particular purpose would arise,
but under the Code, the implied warranty of fitness for particular pur-
pose would be imposed.7"
Particular Purpose. A particular purpose is defined as one which
envisages a specific use by the buyer. 4 The comments to section 2-315
distinguish between walking shoes and mountain climbing shoes. The
comments state: ."For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose
of walking upon ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular
pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains.""3  This example
seems too broad and may mislead the courts, since a sale of mountain
climbing shoes for mountain climbing envisages no specific use by the
buyer." ' It would seem that a warranty for a particular purpose must
arise in a more narrowly defined category. In other words, if a buyer
requested from a seller a pair of mountain climbing shoes, it would ap-
pear that the only warranty which would arise from this transaction
would be an implied warranty of merchantability."' Seller would have
no reason to know any particular purpose for those mountain climbing
shoes and would be justified in selling the buyer a pair of ordinary or
regular mountain climbing shoes.
However, if in the same transaction, the seller had reason to know
that the buyer was going to scale Mount X (if buyer told seller, or the
seller is located in a resort town where Mount X is the only climbing
attraction), which has peculiar characteristics in its rock, as everyone
knows, and which quickly wears out the cleats of most mountain climb-
ing shoes, the seller would select a shoe with a cleat of a special material.
73. See UNIFOa1 COlMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, comment 1. See, e.g., Allen v. Sav-
age Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 159 (Luzerne County Pa. Ct. 1962) (where
a merchant sold a shotgun to a buyer and several months later sold him shells which the
merchant knew would be used in the shotgun, the warranty of particular purpose was
imposed) ; see generally Winston, Article 2-Sales, 22 TENN. L. REv. 785, 797 (1953).
74. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, comment 2; but see, 1 ANDERSON, Op. Cit.
supra note 69, § 2-315:5 ("A particular purpose . . . is a use to which the goods are
not ordinarily put.").
75. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, comment 2.
76. See 1 ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 69, § 2-315:5.
77. See UNIFORM COMIERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (c).
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Then the warranty of particular purpose should apply."'
Another problem presented by section 2-315 is the change of the
Sales Act requirement that the goods be reasonably fit for the particular
purpose. 9  Under the Code, the goods must be "fit for such purpose.""0
Initially this would indicate that the implied warranty of particular pur-
pose may become a strong buyer's section because the reasonable man
standard which afforded the seller some protection under the Sales Act
has been eliminated under the Code. For example, assume that a pair of
mountain climbing shoes are fit for the particular purpose of climbing
Mount X. However, unknown to anyone, an avalanche has uncovered a
new type of rock that will wear out even the special type of cleats on
these shoes. The buyer is injured because the cleats wore out while
climbing Mount X. Under the Sales Act no liability would be created
on the seller because the shoes were reasonably fit for the particular pur-
pose. A strict judicial interpretation of section 2-315, however, would
require the seller to foresee and guard against all remote possibilities in
order to escape liability and might well force sellers into disclaimers that
they ordinarily would not make. Therefore, it will probably be better to
judicially read reasonable into this section since a strict interpretation
would, in fact, ultimately give less protection to the buyer.
Patent or Trade Naine. Under the Sales Act there was no implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose if the buyer purchased an
article by its patent or trade name.8 ' This limitation has been omitted in
the Code, and according to the comments, the designation of an article
by its patent or trade name is now one of the facts to be considered in
determining whether the buyer relied on the seller.82 It has been suggested
78. The use of the broad example in comment 2 plus the use of any in front of
particular purpose in the Code proper implies that the drafters were attempting to ex-
pand the coverage of the implied warranty of particular purpose to include any purpose
of the buyer. The same implication is present in comment 5 which refers to a patented
article as being "adequate for the buyer's purposes," and not "adequate for the buyer's
particular purposes." In the example, whether or not the seller selects a shoe with a
special cleat, the implied warranty of particular purpose is still imposed.
79. IND. ANN STAT. § 58-115(1) (Burns 1962); Stonebrink v. Highland Motors,
171 Ore. 415, 137 P.2d 986 (1943); Libke v. Craig, 35 Wash. 2d 870, 216 P.2d 189
(1950) ; see Indestructible Wheel Co. v. Red Ball Body Corp., 100 Ind. App. 150, 194
N.E. 738 (1935).
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: § 2-315.
81. IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-115(4) (Burns 1962); see, e.g., Michigan Pipe Co. v.
Sullivan County Water Co., 190 Ind. 14, 127 N.E. 768, rehearing denied 190 Ind. 15, 129
N.E. 5 (1920); Adams v. Peter Tramontin Motor Sales Inc., 42 N.J. Super. 313, 126
A.2d 358 (1956). For a discussion of the reluctance of courts to declare a transaction
to be within this section of the Sales Act see 10 CORNELL L.Q. 521 (1925).
82. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, comment 5.
that this is the most important change from prior law. 3 If this is so,
why did the drafters make the change in the comments instead of in the
Code proper? Once the issue is raised, however, no court should hold
that the limitation in the Sales Act continues under the Code for two
reasons: (1) the limitation was expressly included in the Sales Act and
is expressly excluded under the Code; (2) quick reference may be had to
the intent of the legislators by referring to the comments whenever the
section is construed.
The Warranty of Particular Purpose: Express or Implied? The
main problem with section 2-315 is the labeling of the warranty as an
implied warranty. For example, assume the seller, after negotiations,
enters into a sales transaction for the sale of a furnace to heat a twenty-
five room house. If the written contract specifies a heating unit for a
twenty-five room house, why must a warranty for particular purpose be
implied since the seller was quite express about it? Even if no written
contract is entered into, the buyer's particular purpose will be communi-
cated to the seller. Moreover, in the normal situation the seller will mani-
fest in some way that the product is fit for the buyer's particular pur-
pose. In many situations, therefore, no warranty will have to be im-
plied since the seller will make a promise or affirmation of fact that the
goods are fit for the buyer's particular purpose.
Although the labeling, express or implied, does not raise a problem
in the creation of warranties, a significant problem will arise in an at-
tempted disclaimer; i.e., if a seller has sold an article for a buyer's par-
ticular purpose, mentioning in the contract or in the negotiations the
buyer's particular purpose, what is disclaimed if the seller disclaims all
implied warranties? It would seem that, if the product is not fit for the
particular purpose, the seller's disclaimer of the implied warranty of par-
ticular purpose should not be a defense and the seller should be held liable
because he breached his express warranty. Additionally, before a buyer
can recover under section 2-315 he must show that he relied on the seller's
skill and judgment.8" At the same time under section 2-313, the express
warranty section, no reliance on the express warranty is required."5 Con-
sequently if a buyer does not rely on a seller's skill and judgment, no im-
plied warranty of particular purpose can arise but by expressly warrant-
ing the particular purpose, the seller loses any defense of no reliance by
the buyer on the seller's skill and judgment.
83. See HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE) 44 (1955) ; Corman, supra note 69, at 243.
84. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
85. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
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C. IMPLIED WARRANTIES: CONCLUSION
Although there are some changes in the Code treatment of implied
warranties, the basic distinction between implied warranties and express
warranties is still important. Whereas an express warranty arises be-
cause of some action on the part of the seller other than entering into a
sale, an implied warranty arises from the mere entering into a sales agree-
ment. It is imposed by law and does not depend on the agreement of the
parties. The general approach of an implied warranty is to give the
buyer some quality protection. Too much quality protection, however,
may force many sellers to disclaim their implied warranties thus giving
the buyer no protection at all.
The most difficult question of Code interpretation is presented by
the many situations when the standards creating an implied warranty
conflict with the standards of express warranties. When a seller at-
tempts to disclaim any of his warranty obligations, the key issue will be
whether a particular warranty is implied or expressed. Therefore, al-
though the determination that a warranty exists will affect the seller's
liability, the main consequence of the decision to label a warranty as ex-
press or implied will be in the area of disclaimer, because the method,
construction and effect of the disclaimer will depend on which type of
warranty is being disclaimed. It is for this reason that the labeling of a
warranty as express or implied is relevant.
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES: SECTION 2-316
One of the basic notions of contract law is that the parties should
be free to contract the particular aspects of an agreement in their own
terms. Prior to the passage of the Code, it was well settled that a seller
could disclaim any express or implied warranty." The Sales Act spe-
cifically provided for the limitation of implied warranties,88 and the
courts allowed the disclaimer of an express warranty for the reason that
the parties should be free to contract that the buyer take certain risks.8"
In many situations, however, there was, as there is now, no freedom to
contract; and, if a buyer wanted a particular product, he had to buy from
86. See generally 17 ALBANY L. REv. 1, 28 (1953).
87. See generally 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 68, §§ 213, 239; 23 MINN. L. REv.
784 (1939). In many instances the disclaimer would be strictly construed. See, e.g.,
Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951) ; Bekkevold v.
Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927). In some instances the disclaimer would be
held void as against public policy. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
88. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-601 (Burns 1962).
89. See generally HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 83, at 46.
NOTES
seller under the seller's terms.9" In other situations, although not con-
sidered a rule of law, it was a matter of general knowledge, that, because
of the so-called battle of the forms,9 the parties were not aware of any-
thing other than the basic terms of the agreement until they asked the
courts to, in a word, arbitrate the battle and tell the parties what they
agreed to in their contract. In both situations many buyers did not know
of the existence of a disclaimer until it was too late. In light of the
severity of such disclaimers, the courts eventually began to avoid them by
strictly construing the language of the disclaimer against the seller92 or
by declaring the disclaimer void as against public policy.93
A. DisCLAIArER9 OF ExPREss WARRANTIES: SECTION 2-316(1)
As previously indicated, an express warranty is an affirmation of
fact or promise relating to the goods which forms part of the basis of the
bargain. 5 For example, seller and buyer enter into an agreement for the
sale of a new car. The contract has specific terms dealing with the fi-
nance terms, the accessories, the type of transmission, the year, make,
model, color, etc., plus a warranty that the dealer will replace all parts
and provide maintenance for a certain period of time or mileage. At the
end of this warranty is a statement that "This warranty is expressly in
lieu of any other express or implied warranty or any obligation on the
part of the seller." In many instances the contract which the seller pre-
90. If it be admitted that some or all of these manufacturers' warranty clauses
are unfair to the buyer, it may be urged that the buyers are at fault in ac-
cepting such inadequate protection and deserve no sympathy. This argument,
however, ignores a certain limitation on freedom of contract in such cases.
Many manufacturers . . . have formed trade organizations and agreed to the
universal use of these limited warranty clauses. Many buyers have no choice.
If they desire to purchase . . . they must accept the standard, uniform contract.
Bogart & Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL.
L. REV. 400, 413 (1931).
91. It is not within the scope of this note to discuss the problems presented by the
battle of the forms. The Code attempts to resolve the problem in § 2-204(2).
92. See, e.g., Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951);
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927) ; 23 MINN. L. REv. 789 (1939).
93. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
46 CORNELL L.Q. 607 (1961) ; 74 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1961) ; contra, Knecht v. Universal
Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1962); 38 N.D.L. REv. 529 (1962).
94. In the Code, the traditional language of disclaimer has been discarded in favor
of negation and limitation in § 2-316(1) (dealing with express warranties) and exclude
and modify in § 2-316(2) (dealing with implied warranties). In the comments, however,
the drafters return to the traditional language of disclainer. Why the drafters did not
use similar terms in § 2-316 as opposed to four different terms is not apparent. In other
words, is it possible to exclude or modify an express warranty (the terms which appear
in the implied warranty section) or negate or linit an implied warranty (the terms
which appear in the express warranty section)? For purposes of space and clarity, the
traditional language will be used in this note.
95. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
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sents to the buyer to be signed is written in terms that the buyer is the
one who wrote it, e.g., a buyer's purchase order. In effect, seller is say-
ing: "Although I promised buyer a car with particular attributes and
affirmed that it would have certain characteristics, I now warn buyer
that I am promising nothing."
Based on a formal interpretation that all terms of an agreement
should be consistent, the absurdity of allowing a seller to disclaim an
express warranty is apparent. This is particularly true when one con-
siders that if a seller is allowed to disclaim generally, he has probably
negated the majority of his duties or obligations under the agreement.
In an attempt to solve this problem,96 the earlier drafts of the Code pro-
vided that "If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaim-
ing it are inoperative."7 Based on the policy of protecting a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained for language of disclaimer, the drafters
were merely applying a general contract construction rule that, if general
language conflicts with specific language, the specific language controls. 3
The elimination of disclaimers of express warranties was generally ac-
claimed by most authorities and writers as analytically resting on sound
logic and good policy.9 This treatment, however, implied that the sales
agreement was not to be read as a whole, but rather each part of the
agreement was to be read separately, e.g., the express warranty was to be
read and given effect before reading any other part of the agreement, in-
cluding the disclaimer. By declaring that disclaimers were inoperative, the
drafters of the Code prevented the seller from making any argument that
the disclaimer was evidence that no warranty was ever created, as opposed
to a created warranty disclaimed.
Under the present draft of the Code, the unequivocal language of
the earlier drafts of section 2-316(1) has been changed. 0 and replaced
by a seemingly verbose and confusing mass of language :101
96. See 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 331, 348 (1954).
97. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (1952 Official Draft).
98. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs §§ 235-36 (1932).
99. See HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 83, at 47; Collins, supra note 69, at 68;
Winston, supra note 73, at 800; 53 COLUm. L. REv. 858, 868 (1953) ; 15 U. PITT. L. REv.
326, 348 (1954).
100. "Subsequently subsection (1) of the 1952 official draft was rewritten and
subsection (3) (a) and (3) (b) changed for clarification to meet criticism by the New
York Commission." AzMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1956 RECOMMENDATION OF THE EDI-
TORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 40 (1956). The criticism of the
New York Commission appears in 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REvIs ON CoMMIssION,
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 403-06 (1955).
101. "The noble intent of the drafters of the Code was blunted by the criticisms
of the New York Law Revision Commission . . . and the revision of the provision in
response to that criticism has been obscurity." Lorensen, The Uniform Comnercial
Code Sales Article Compared with West Virginia Law, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 142, 169-70
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Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is in-
operative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable? 2
To understand this language specific fact situations of an express war-
ranty in the agreement or an alleged oral express warranty, both with
a general and specific disclaimer, should be analyzed.
An Express Warranty in the Written Agreement With a General Dis-
claimer. In the majority of disclaimer or express warranty situations,
the general disclaimer is used. The Code abolishes this disclaimer" 3 by
relying on the rule of construction that, if there is a conflict between
general and specific provisions, the specific provision prevails.' 4
An Express Warranty in the Written Agreement With a Specific
Disclaimer. Where an express warranty is met by a specific disclaimer,
most authorities agree that the specific disclaimer must be given some
consideration. Such consideration is merited not on the theory that an
express warranty has been disclaimed, but, as one authority states, on
the theory that the specific disclaimer, being a part of the basic agree-
ment, is evidence under the reasonable construction rule that the seller
created no express warranty." 5 If the express warranty appears in the
written agreement, however, it is difficult to comprehend how a specific
disclaimer could be evidence that no express warranty has been created.
Furthermore, analyzing the situation on general contract principles
is impossible. The rule that a specific provision prevails over a general
provision is inapplicable due to a head-on meeting of two specific provi-
(1962). "Its language says nothing; it means nothing. In effect, section 2-316(1) re-
enacts the Sales Act coverage of exclusion and modification-which was non-existent."
Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Comnmnercial Code on the California Law of Sales
Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 311 (1961).
102. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(1).
103. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(1), comment 1. See generally 49
Ky. L.J. 240, 253 (1960). "[A] contract is normally a contract for a sale of something
describable and described. A clause generally disclaiming 'all warranties, express or
implied' cannot reduce the seller's obligation with respect to such description and there-
fore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-313, comment 4.
104. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236(c) (1932).
105. See generally HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 83, at 47. In Alaska Pacific
Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643, 657 n.12 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge Frank
stated that a disclaimer was evidence that no express warranty ever arose, not that a
warranty had been disclaimed. It appears the New York Commission accepts the new
statutory language. See COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, NENW YORK ANNOTA-
TIONS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND REPORT OF COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS To LEGISLATURE OF NEW YORK STATE, 44-45 (1961).
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sions. Any argument that such an inconsistency should be ruled in favor
of the buyer is met by the argument that parties are free to contract as
they please and that freedom of contract allows a seller to be grossly in-
consistent. The drafters of section 2-316(1), however, have evidently
accepted a position that a seller should not benefit by his inconsistencies
by providing that words creating an express warranty and words of dis-
claimer shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each
other. Obviously, a written express warranty and a specific disclaimer
cannot be reasonably construed as consistent with each other and to give
effect to one and not the other would be unreasonable. In that situation,
section 2-316(1) explicitly provides that "negation or limitation is in-
operative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.""'
Considering only express warranties in a written agreement, it would
seem that the present treatment of disclaimers differs only in statutory
language from the previous Code treatment. Under the prior drafts all
disclaimers of express warranties were inoperative;17 whereas, under
the present draft, if the express warranty appears in the written agree-
ment then a general or specific disclaimer is inoperative. There is, how-
ever, one situation where the change in the present draft of the Code is
important. That is where the express warranty which the buyer seeks to
enforce does not appear in the written agreement.
Express Warranties Not Appearing in the Written Agreement: Spe-
cific Disclaimer. There are two situations in which the buyer may be at-
tempting to enforce an express warranty which does not appear in the
written agreement of the parties: (1) an oral express warranty, or (2)
other situations, for example, where past deliveries have expressly set
the description of quality by a course of dealing." 8
Under prior drafts of the Code, a disclaimer of an express warranty
was irnoperative." 9 If a buyer, therefore, was seeking to recover on an
alleged oral express warranty and a seller had specifically disclaimed the
alleged oral express warranty, the court would have to allow the buyer
to prove his alleged oral express warranty. The seller would, of course,
argue that the parol evidence rule11" prevented the buyer from proving the
alleged oral express warranty because the alleged oral express warranty
would conflict with the specific disclaimer which was intended by the
106. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(1).
107. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
108. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 5.
109. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (1952 Official Draft); see note 97 and
accompanying text supra.
110. See UNIFORM COao MFRCIAL CODE § 2-202. The parol evidence rule in the 1952
draft is exactly the same as that in the 1958 draft. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-202 (1952 Official Draft).
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parties as a final expression of their written agreement. Section 2-202,
the parol or extrinsic evidence section of the Code provides, as it did in
prior drafts, that "Terms . . set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement . . . may not be con-
tradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous
oral agreement."'' Thus it would appear that the seller attempting to
defeat an alleged oral express warranty would have a strong argument.
In order to accept this argument the court would have to give effect to
the specific disclaimer as a term of the agreement, which would contra-
dict the statutory language of the earlier drafts of the Code which de-
clared that all disclaimers of express warranties were inoperathve.
By omitting the inoperative language, however, the courts have af-
forded a seller protection against express warranties claimed by a buyer
which do not appear in the written agreement. If the seller has not dis-
claimed the oral express warranty which the buyer is alleging, there is
no term in the agreement with which the alleged oral express warranty
conflicts and the buyer is given an opportunity to prove the warranty
upon which he is relying. By allowing the seller to disclaim specifically,
the seller faced with an alleged oral express warranty can argue that the
parol evidence section of the Code" 2 prevents the buyer from proving the
alleged oral express warranty. For example, assume in a sales agreement
for a car that a provision states, "The seller does not warrant the mile-
age of the car." If the buyer seeks to prove that the seller promised the
buyer that the car would have 5,000 miles on it, the seller could argue
that the specific disclaimer shows that, as to that particular point, the
parties intended that the written specific disclaimer be the final expres-
sion of their agreement and not contradictable by evidence of an oral
express warranty.
To anticipate every possible express warranty which a buyer could
allege and specifically disclaim each one would impose a tremendous, if
not impossible, burden on the seller. The question presented, therefore,
is whether or not there is any way the seller could insert a general dis-
claimer of all oral express warranties indicating that the written agree-
ment is the final expression of the parties.
Express Warranties Not Appearing in the Written Agreement: Gen-
eral Disclaimer. As previously indicated, if the express warranty ap-
pears in the written agreement, the drafters of the Code have declared
that the general disclaimer must fall because of certain construction
111. UNIORIS1 COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
112. Ibid.
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rules."' If a general disclaimer of an oral express warranty, however,
appears in the written agreement, no construction problem is presented
until the oral express warranty is introduced into evidence. An attempt
by the buyer to introduce the alleged oral express warranty into evidence
is met by the argument that the parol evidence rule of section 2-202 of
the Code prevents the buyer from proving the warranty, because the
general disclaimer of oral express warranties indicates that the parties
have reduced all express warranties to writing and the alleged warranty
conflicts with the general disclaimer of oral express warranties. Since
the alleged express warranty cannot be introduced into evidence, no in-
consistency need be resolved under section 2-316(1) of the Code; and
the seller, by generally disclaiming all oral express warranties, has given
himself protection against fraudulent claims, without having to resort to
a specific disclaimer of every possible oral warranty.
Disclaimer of Express Warranties: Conclusion. Earlier drafts of
the Code declared that all disclaimers were inoperative. This position
would tend to place the seller in the precarious position of possible lia-
bility due to fraudulent oral express warranty claims of the buyer. The
prior drafts, in doing this, discarded key contract construction rules.
In section 2-316(1), the disclaimer of express warranties section of
the present Code, the language is difficult to understand, basically be-
cause the attempt of the drafters is to resolve a conflict between dis-
claimers and express warranties through construction principles rather
than by eliminating completely the ability of a seller to disclaim express
warranties. The present treatment is more consistent with the general
construction rules that a contract must be read as a whole so as to give
effect to each part if reasonably possible;114 and, if there is a conflict
between general and specific provisions, the specific provisions prevail."'
If the express warranty appears in the written agreement, the buyer re-
ceives the maximum protection. If the express warranty does not appear
in the written agreement, the seller can take certain measures whereby he
can receive the maximum protction.
B. DISCLAIMER OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES: SECTIONS 2-316(2)
AND 2-316(3)
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular
113. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
114. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236 (1932); Ahlborn v. City of Hammond,
232 Ind. 12, 111 N.E.2d 70 (1953).
115. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236(c) (1932) ; State v. Scott Constr. Co.,
97 Ind. App. 652, 174 N.E. 429 (1931). See generally 1 WILLISTON, Op. Cit. supra note
68, § 2-3; 49 Ky. L.J. 240, 253 (1960).
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purpose are imposed by operation of law upon the terms of the sale and
require no action by the seller. As a result of the imposition by law, no
construction or inconsistency problems, such as appeared in express war-
ranty disclaimers, are present in disclaimers of implied warranties.
Therefore, special implied warranty disclaimer rules are required." 6 Sec-
tion 2-316(2), the disclaimer of implied warranties section of the Code
provides:
subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be con-
spicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is suf-
ficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.""'
Subject to an exception to be discussed below, the fine print general
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability is doomed under
section 2-316(2). If the implied warranty of merchantability is to be
disclaimed in the written contract, it must be in writing and conspicu-
ous."' If, on the other hand, the disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability is oral, it must only mention merchantability."' Since
the Code does not specify in what situations the disclaimer of the implied
warranty of merchantability must be in writing, 2 ' an obvious implication
would have been to require that if an agreement is reduced to writing,
the disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must also be in
writing to be effective. Section 2-316(2), however, does not legislate
a rule in this direction. It therefore seems that, subject to the parol evi-
dence rule, a seller would be allowed to prove an oral disclaimer even
though the agreement has been reduced to writing. As a practical mat-
ter, proving an oral disclaimer of an implied warranty would be very
116. Although there might be a policy argument that a duty imposed by law (im-
plied warranty) is even higher than a duty imposed by a party on himself (express
warranty) and, therefore, should be harder to eliminate, it is apparent that the drafters
of the Code did not consider this policy argument too convincing.
117. UN FomU CommEnciAL CoDE § 2-316(2).
118. Ibid. "'Conspicuous': A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it ...
Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting
type or color." UNIFO1m Coma EacxAx, CODE § 1-201(10).
119. See UNIFORM Com,%mciA, CODE § 2-316(2).
120. The 1952 Official Draft of § 2-316(2) provided: "Exclusion or modification
of the implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose must
be in specific language and if the inclusion of such language creates an ambiguity in
the contract as a whole it shall be resolved against the seller."
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difficult when the agreement has been reduced to writing. Consequently
sellers, rather than rely on oral disclaimers, should make a disclaimer a
part of the written agreement.
Section 2-316(2) requires that to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of particular purpose there must be a conspicuous writing, al-
though the language may be general. 2' As previously indicated, there
is some discontent with labeling the warranty of particular purpose as
implied in the first instance since it is arguable that such a warranty has
more characteristics of an express than an implied warranty. In an
earlier draft of the Code the drafters seemed to acknowledge this dis-
content with the warranty of particular purpose and required that spe-
cific language similar to that of an express warranty disclaimer be used
to effectively disclaim that the goods would be fit for a particular
purpose.
122
In the present draft of section 2-316(2), the drafters return to an
implied warranty treatment and allow the disclaimer to be general, al-
though it does have to be in writing. The reason, according to the
drafters, was "to relieve the seller from the requirement of disclaiming
the warranty of fitness in specific language and yet afford the buyer an
adequate warning of such disclaimer."' 22  If the warranty of fitness for
particular purpose is to be regarded as an implied warranty, then the
approach of the present draft is more consistent in that the disclaimer is
more like a disclaimer of an implied warranty. If, however, the war-
ranty is regarded as implied for traditional purposes, but analytically is
more like an express warranty, then the present draft is inadequate in its
present treatment. Since most sellers will, in fact, expressly warrant the
particular purpose in their sales transactions, they should be warned that
the general disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose may not meet the ends they desire.
Disclaimer of Implied Warranties by the Use of Certain Terms:
Section 2-316(3) (a). In addition to the general statutory language deal-
ing with the disclaimer of an implied warranty, section 2-316 of the Code
also allows a disclaimer by the use of certain terms. Subsection (3)
provides:
121. UNIFORM Co mmRciAL CoDE § 2-316(2), comment 4.
122. In the 1952 Official Draft, § 2-316(2) provided: "Exclusion or modification
of the implied warranty . . . of fitness for a particular purpose must be in specific
language. .. "
123. AMERICAN LAw INsTiT TE, SUPPLEMENT NO. 1-UNIFORM COMM1ERCLAL CODE,
10 (1955). No explanation was given as to why the seller had to be relieved of this
requirement.
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Notwithstanding subsection (2) (a) unless the circumstances
indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by ex-
pressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the ex-
clusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty . 124
The drafters noted in the comments that "Such terms in ordinary com-
mercial usage are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire risk
as to the quality of the goods involved."' 25  This comment creates some
difficulty because now sellers do not have to state in their contracts:
"This warranty is expressly in lieu of any other express or implied war-
ranty or any obligation on the part of the seller," or "The seller hereby
disclaims the warranty of merchantability." All the seller is required to
state is that "The buyer buys the product as is." The basic theory of im-
plied warranties was to create a quality obligation on the seller. The ba-
sic theory of the previous sections of disclaimer was to warn the buyer
that certain quality obligations were being disclaimed, but certainly buyer
warning and protection are disregarded by section 2-316(3) (a). In the
commercial world there might be some basis in fact that the terms do
indicate to a buyer that he is taking the quality risks, but this argument
falls when dealing with the ultimate consumer who probably has no
knowledge of the meaning of the terms. The effectiveness of section
2-316(3) (a), therefore, may be placed in doubt when an injured buyer
must overcome the use of certain terms in order to recover. The courts
may find no difficulty in avoiding these disclaimers on the grounds of
public policy.
Now comes the finishing touch to the destruction of the theory that
the Code affords the buyer protection when the seller disclaims his im-
plied warranties. Subsection (2) of section 2-316, the disclaimer of im-
plied warranties section, is introduced by the phrase "Subject to subsec-
tion (3) . . ... "; and it is in subsection (2) that the rule is declared that
a written disclaimer must be conspicuous. Subsection (3) of section
2-316, which deals with the use of the terms "as is," etc., begins with the
language "Notwithstanding subsection (2) . . . . " The use of the in-
troductory language of these two subsections allows for only one con-
124. UmloRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(3)(a). Note that in § 2-316(3)(a)
there is some confusion in the language. Although clearly talking about implied war-
ranties, the Code states "[O]ther language which in common understanding calls the
buyers attention to the exclusion of warranties. .. ."
125. UN FORMx COMMERCIAL. CODE § 2-316, comment 7. There is no Indiana case
law on the use of the terms, but the Code seems to be in accord with prior law. See 1
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 68, § 239.
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clusion; if the implied warranties are disclaimed generally in the written
agreement, it must be conspicuous, but if certain terms, which supposedly
warn buyers that their warranties are being disclaimed, are used, they do
not have to be conspicuous. Yes, the general disclaimer of implied war-
ranties is doomed by the Code. This is not for the reason that the Code
desires to protect buyers from unbargained for language. The general
disclaimer is doomed, because under the present draft of the Code, the
general disclaimer of implied warranties is too verbose and would be too
conspicuous. All sellers have to say is that the buyer buys "as is" and the
language can be as minute and as hidden in the contract as it has been in
the past.
Disclaimer of Implied Warranties: Conclusion. Section 2-316(2)
and (3), the disclaimer of implied warranties section of the Code are
verbose and confusing. 6 Allowing a general disclaimer of the implied
warranties, even though conspicuous, and in writing, may not reflect the
contemporary trend in American law. This indicates that the drafters
of the Code may be somewhat antedated in this respect. Permitting a
seller to disclaim all of his implied warranties by the use of the term "as
is" completely destroys any concept that the Code is giving the buyer
protection in regard to the quality of the products.
Actually there is very little change from prior law in the area of
disclaimer of implied warranties. As such, the courts with or without
the aid of the Code are going to avoid these disclaimers.Y With the
hostility of the courts toward disclaimers becoming more apparent, sellers
in the commercial world of today may do well to take the implied advice
of the drafters of the Code and forget about using the disclaimer of the
implied warranties to limit their liability. The wisest thing sellers can
do is limit the remedies which the buyer can use. In other words, al-
though the general trend of the warranty sections of the Code is for
more buyer protection, the seller can, through negotiations, limit the
amount the buyer may recover for the seller's breach of warranty. Sec-
tion 2-316(4) provides: "Remedies for breach of warranty can be lim-
ited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sec-
tions 2-718 and 2-719).,n2s
Sections 2-718 and 2-719, in essence, allow the parties to liquidate or
126. "Could the central idea of these provisions have been made clear to reasonably
intelligent judges with fewer words and fewer technical distinctions?" HONNOLD, CASES
ON VHE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING, 112 (2d ed. 1962).
127. See cases cited in note 87 supra.
128. UNIFORM COmmERC AL CODE § 2-316(4).
